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President Obama’s Victories in Illinois:  2012 Compared to 2008 
By:  John S. Jackson      Paul Simon Public Policy Institute 
Abstract:  This paper describes and analyzes President Obama’s 2012 election victory in 
Illinois and compares it to his earlier victory in 2008 in his home state.  It also extends the 
analysis back through the 2004 and 2000 presidential elections and shows how those results 
were similar and where they differed.  It primarily relies on the county and county election 
returns supplemented by U. S. Census data as the unit of analysis.  The paper sets Illinois into 
a national electoral context describing what is happening in an era of deep partisan 
polarization coupled with the prospects for a partisan realignment. 
Introduction 
Barack Obama is the first President elected directly from Illinois since both Abraham Lincoln 
and Ulysses S. Grant won two elections each during the Civil War and its immediate aftermath 
in the 1860s and 1870s.    Other candidates from Illinois have run and been a factor in the 
presidential sweepstakes such as Adlai E.  Stevenson, II who ran twice and was twice defeated 
by the same man, Dwight Eisenhower, in 1952 and 1956. We have also produced several viable 
candidates who sought their party’s nomination unsuccessfully including John Anderson, Paul 
Simon, and Phillip Crane. Adlai E.  Stevenson was Cleveland’s Vice President in 1892 and John A. 
Logan was James G. Blaine’s Vice Presidential running mate in 1884.  However, Barack Obama is 
the first candidate from Illinois to actually win the nomination, twice, and win the general 
election, twice, since the Civil War era.  As a producer of presidents Illinois is now somewhat 
behind the three leaders, Virginia, New York, and Ohio but equal with Texas in the second tier 
of states which have produced multiple presidents and who have had their careers shaped by 
their state’s politics before climbing to national fame (Stanley and Niemi, 2010, 233-237).  
Paul Simon’s influential book, Lincoln’s Preparation for Greatness, showed just how important 
Lincoln’s experience in Illinois politics, especially his time in the Illinois General Assembly was in 
shaping his views and values and his approach to governing in Washington (Simon, 1971).  A 
similar work on Obama would also conclude that his service in the Illinois General Assembly 
was an important factor in shaping his views and political style and values.  That period also 
produced some indicators of how he might approach being president especially through the 
seeking of bipartisan solutions to difficult problems and courting cooperation across the aisle.  
His record in Illinois indicates that Obama is by nature a conciliator, a consensus seeker and 
coalition builder and that was his major forte during his time in the Illinois legislature. It was 
also his initial approach to the presidency although that changed as time went on and 
experience with the Congress in a highly polarized and partisan era changed him by the 
beginning of his second term.   Likewise studying Obama’s three statewide victories in Illinois 
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politics provides some worthwhile clues as to where he had the most and least electoral appeal 
in 2008 and 2012 and how he approached the very political task of building an electoral 
majority in a large and diverse state like Illinois.   
In 2006 I wrote a Simon Review paper documenting the rise of Barack Obama to a position of 
power in Illinois politics via his winning the U. S. Senate seat in 2004 (Jackson, 2006).  Later I 
extended this analysis to Obama’s victory in Illinois in his first quest for the presidency (Jackson, 
2009).  Obama’s 2008 presidential nomination and subsequent election victory, one of nearly 
landslide proportion in the Electoral College, was almost unprecedented for a candidate who 
was as young and unknown on the national stage as he was at the time, and it was absolutely 
unprecedented for a candidate with his racial identity to ascend to the White House while 
defeating two of the most experienced and respected recent candidates, Hillary Clinton and 
John McCain, one Democrat and one Republican, in the process.   
The current paper is a continuation of that series documenting how Obama fared in his 
presidential re-election race of 2012. At that point Obama was certainly no longer unknown 
and his record in the management of the government, especially in regard to his management 
of the economy, was the central point of contention in the 2012 general election. In addition, 
the polarized state of American politics has been the major fact of political life in Washington 
recently, especially after the gains of the Republican Party and its Tea Party faction in the 2010 
mid-term elections (Levendusky, 2009; Fiorina, 2005; White, 2003).   
When the Democrats lost control of the U. S. House and suffered reduced numbers in the 
Senate after 2010, bipartisanship and conciliation largely became things of the past in the 
Obama Administration, and it became much more difficult for the president to get any of his 
major legislative priorities enacted in such a divided Congress.  Partisan and ideological gridlock 
and stalemate became much more the norm during the second half of Obama’s first term. 
The national election was certainly a referendum on Obama’s stewardship of his office and of 
the government, and the same was true in Illinois.  This paper details how he did in Illinois in 
2012 and how this election compared with his electoral record from 2008.  Illinois has been a 
typical state for national politics for a long time.  One study based on U. S. Census data ranked 
Illinois as “the most average state” in the union (Ohlemacher, 2007).  Indeed, despite its 
reputation as a leading blue or pro-Democratic state currently (Green, 2003; Green 2007), 
Illinois is still one where either party can win statewide depending on the candidate and the 
circumstances of the moment (Jackson, 2011).   
In creating this longitudinal electoral record I hope to shed some light on the larger patterns of 
both continuity and change in Illinois and national politics as illustrated by the Obama elections.  
Obama’s record has been written in less than a decade since he first appeared on the state and 
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then the national scene and went on to achieve the kind of success only realized by a handful of 
presidents who have been elected to two terms.  In fact, of the 43 presidents we have had in 
the United States prior to Obama, only seventeen, or less than half, have been elected to a 
second term.  So, Obama has already joined select company from a very small universe which 
begins with George Washington at the founding of the Republic in 1789 and extends through 
George W. Bush who prevailed in the first two elections of the 21st Century (Stanley and Niemi, 
2010, 17-21).  
Illinois certainly played a crucial role in shaping the political values and the career of the young 
Barack Obama, not only providing him his first home and profession as a new college graduate 
and later a new law school graduate, but also providing him the political base to move from 
South Side Chicago community organizer and constitutional law professor at the University of 
Chicago, to the Illinois State Senate, and then to the United States Senate, all before he had 
reached his 45th birthday.  For all the controversy which seemed to never die over his 
birthplace, no one ever doubted that his political home was firmly planted in Illinois. That 
grounding in Illinois was topped by an overwhelming popular election victory in 2008, both 
nationally and in the state, and then confirmed by another popular vote victory, by a smaller 
but still convincing margin in 2012.   
On a common sense or conventional wisdom basis, one might think initially that there was 
nothing at all unusual about a presidential candidate winning his home state.  That is the most 
common outcome in American presidential elections; and if a candidate is not carrying his 
home state, preferably by a wide margin, then he is probably in some trouble nationally.  While 
carrying the home state is the norm, it is by no means a confirmed law of politics. There are 
several recent examples of presidential candidates not carrying their home states.   Al Gore was 
elected U. S. Senator from Tennessee first in 1984 and then again by a larger margin in 1990 
and he had been a four term Congressman before then.  Yet in 2000 Gore failed to carry his 
own state and thus lost the election to George W. Bush in a much disputed outcome involving a 
537 official vote margin in Florida and the 5:4 vote of the U. S. Supreme Court.  However, Gore 
would not have even needed Florida if he had just carried Tennessee, which was not out of the 
question since he and Bill Clinton together had carried both Tennessee and Arkansas in 1992 
and 1996.   
Or consider the case of Mitt Romney who lost the state he had served as Governor, 
Massachusetts, which Obama won by a 63.20 percent margin in 2012.  In addition, Romney lost 
his native state, Michigan, the state where he was born and raised, and the state his father had 
served as Governor, by a similar margin in 2012 when Obama carried Michigan by a 58.37 
percent margin. Romney also had a second home in New Hampshire, which he repaired to 
frequently to escape the rigors of the campaign trail during the 2012 election, and he also lost 
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New Hampshire by a narrow but still decisive 54.87 percent Obama margin. He also lost 
California, another state where he had a home, by a wide margin.   In summary, Mitt Romney 
did not have a place where he could claim a home state advantage unless it was Utah where he 
scored his biggest victory of the 2012 election with an overwhelming 74 percent of the popular 
vote (David Wasserman, Redistricting web site, accessed Nov. 21, 2012, unofficial and partially 
incomplete returns).   
Going back in history, Adlai E. Stevenson, II ran twice against Dwight Eisenhower in both 1952 
and 1956, and he lost Illinois both times.  Illinois was Stevenson’s home state, the place he had 
served as Governor, the place where he had built his political reputation and base, and he lost it 
twice.  Making it remarkably evident how much our politics have changed, it is even more 
notable now to consider that Adlai Stevenson carried all of the states of the Deep South, while 
losing Texas, Virginia, Florida and Tennessee, in both 1952 and 1956, and only losing the Deep 
South’s Louisiana in 1956. The South was the Democratic base in that era. But Stevenson lost 
Illinois both times. Times have certainly changed with the Deep South and the peripheral South 
now forming the virtually unassailable bedrock of the Republican presidential core.  
In 2012, Obama’s victory in Illinois was sizable although it was not greater than in his native 
state of Hawaii or the District of Columbia and several other Northeastern and Midwestern 
states which exceeded the percentage Obama gained in Illinois.  These states are the latest 
markers in the party realignment which has seen the Northeast and parts of the industrial 
Midwest transformed from solidly favoring the Republicans in presidential elections to 
providing the most promising base for Democrats in our current presidential politics.  
For most of the 20th century Illinois was one of the most typical states from an overall 
demographic and political perspective.  Illinois almost always reflects the national vote and in 
the 20th Century; it only went against the national winner in 1916 when the state voted for 
Charles Evans Hughes over the Democratic incumbent, Woodrow Wilson, and in 1976 Illinois 
again swam against the national tide and voted for Gerald Ford over Jimmy Carter.  Those were 
the only two instances in the entire 20th Century when Illinois voted against the presidential 
winner. More recently, in the 1980s Illinois voted for Reagan twice and for George H. W. Bush 
in 1988. That was four consecutive wins for the Republicans. So, for that century, Illinois was a 
competitive state where either party could win which both reflected and helped lead the 
national trends in presidential politics. 
In many important ways, Illinois politics are indicative of larger trends in national politics. In a 
realigning era, Illinois has trended more and more firmly toward the Democratic Party and the 
Republicans have lost significant ground in this state over the past two decades of presidential 
and statewide elections.  Since 1992 when Illinois went for Clinton, Illinois has been one of the 
leading and most dependable components of any Democratic presidential candidate’s core 
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strength. Clinton won twice.  Then Gore won Illinois in 2000; John Kerry won in 2004, and 
Obama won in 2008 and 2012. While this is a consistently pro-Democratic victory outcome, it is 
also worth noting that except for 2004, Illinois voted for the winner of the national popular vote 
in every election since 1976 and in that respect can be considered “typical”.   The contours of 
Obama’s victory map illustrate that transition from Republican victories under Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush to Democratic victories under Clinton and Obama.   
Sports fans know that there is a definite home court advantage in basketball, baseball, hockey 
and other sports, and ordinarily that analogy carries over to politics as well but not always.  So 
it is worthwhile to analyze how and where Obama fashioned his adopted home state victory in 
both 2008 and in 2012 and what important trends in American politics are indicated by those 
victories.  That is the objective of this paper.   
 
The Data Analysis 
Let us begin by examining the size and scope of President Obama’s victory both nationally and 
in Illinois.  On the national level, Obama won a majority of the popular vote with approximately 
51.03 percent of the total compared to 47.19 percent for Romney.  This resulted from Obama’s 
approximately 65,899,583 total votes to Romney’s 60,931,966 - a margin of almost five million 
(http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2012, accessed Jan. 11, 2013).  
While the popular vote was somewhat close, the Electoral College vote was almost a blow out 
for Obama.  He beat Romney by a 332 to 206 vote margin, or a 62 percent Electoral College 
victory. Obama carried 26 states, plus the District of Columbia, compared to 24 for Romney. 
This provided only a narrow net state advantage to Obama; however, the president carried far 
more of the larger states and he carried eight out of ten of the states originally considered to be 
the most competitive, or “battleground” states which either candidate could have won and 
where both candidates spent an extraordinary amount of time campaigning personally.  For all 
the enormous amount of time, energy and resources the Romney campaign poured into the 
battleground states, he ultimately emerged with victories in only North Carolina and Indiana as 
two take-away states from the 2008 Obama Electoral College margin of 365 to 173 over John 
McCain.   
This map illustrates the way the Electoral College normally works.  That is, a fairly narrow 
victory in the popular vote, especially if it exceeds a majority at 50 to 51 percent, usually 
translates into a much larger Electoral College victory. The 2012 election provided another case 
reinforcing that general rule.   Supporters of the Electoral College contend that this Electoral 
College magnification of the majority is good for the system.  They argue that it is effective in 
bestowing a sense of legitimacy and claiming rights on an electoral mandate if the Electoral 
7 
 
College vote victory is by a significantly wide margin.  Map 1 provides the graphic display of 
those national popular and electoral vote returns.   
    
 
 
 
The national results then provide the context for analyzing the Illinois results.  Obama carried 
Illinois with 57.60 percent of the total popular vote.  This was in comparison with the 61.92 
percent he carried Illinois by in 2008 (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2013 and 2008). This 
marked a decline in the Obama popular vote in Illinois of 4.32 percent between 2008 and 2012.   
So, in that sense, Obama actually lost some ground in Illinois between 2008 and 2012, which 
was also true nationally when his popular vote margin declined from 52.9 percent to 51.03 
percent or a net decline of 1.87 percent nationally (Stanley and Niemi, 2010, 25; David 
Liep,http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=2012, accessed, January 11, 
2013). Thus, Obama lost a somewhat larger percentage of the Illinois popular vote than he did 
of the national popular vote in 2012.   The economic situation which had worked in Obama’s 
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favor in 2008 had less positive impact for him in 2012 even though it was probably overall still a 
net positive, narrowly, according to the polls. 
In some respects the geographical totals were mirrored at the state level if you use the county 
as the unit of analysis.  The analogy is not entirely apt since the counties are not constitutionally 
or legally the same thing as the states in the Electoral College.  Ultimately it does not matter 
much how many counties a candidate carries, but it does matter critically how many states, and 
which states, the candidate for president carries.  Nevertheless, counties are important units of 
local government and they are key party organizational building blocks and political rallying 
points as well. The county court houses usually are filled with officials who are the backbone of 
their local party organizations (Jackson, 2011). In this sense, the counties are an effective 
window onto the world of local politics.   They represent grassroots leaders and average voters 
down at a level where most people live and receive governmental services and where they pay 
significant amounts of their local taxes. 
In addition, most counties are embedded in and reflect their own particular political culture.  In 
most states, certainly in Illinois, there are counties which are well known as Democratic or 
Republican strongholds where the candidates at the top of the ticket do not seem to matter 
much as these counties vote routinely for their traditional party favorite no matter what the 
national or statewide trends may be at the time.  There are others which can be relied on as 
marginal or swing counties where the results change from election to election and immediately 
reflect the political tides of the moment and which are also potentially involved in longer term 
transitions from one political party to another. If you are going to capture the picture of long 
term secular changes in American politics, county level voting returns are a very good place to 
document those processes in action.  For all those reasons, the counties are important units of 
analysis for any election, including the presidential elections. 
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Map 2 provides the results by county for the 2012 presidential election in Illinois.  It is 
immediately evident from this table that Obama carried only 23 counties compared to 79 for 
Romney. Obama carried northeastern Illinois, northwestern Illinois, and a smattering of other 
counties.  Thus, in terms of sheer geography, the map of Illinois had far more red territory than 
blue showing on it on Tuesday night, November 6th.  Appendix A provides the complete 2012 
voting returns for the two major parties for each Illinois county. 
Table 1 displays the 2012 election return data divided into the traditional three major 
geographical sections of the state, i.e. Chicago and Cook County, the five Collar Counties which 
form the suburban ring around Chicago, and the remaining 96 counties which are routinely 
referred to as “Downstate.”    
Cook County accounts for 40 percent of the total population in the state.  Obviously it is the 
major prize in any statewide contest no matter which year and what candidates are involved.  
In 2012 Cook County provided a large vote total margin of 1,488,537 for Obama and 495,542 
for Romney (Illinois State Board of Elections, website, accessed, January 9, 2013).  Obviously, 
Cook County and Chicago were absolutely essential keys to the size of the statewide victory for 
Obama.  However, contrary to popular belief in Downstate Illinois, they were certainly not the 
whole story. The popular vote total for Obama from Cook County was 49.30 percent of his 
statewide popular vote margin. In other words, with 40 percent of the state’s population, Cook 
County provided almost half of Obama’s total votes in Illinois. 
The additional Obama margin of victory in the popular vote came especially and notably from 
the five Collar Counties.  Obama carried four of those five, losing only McHenry narrowly.  In 
those five counties combined Obama scored a 647,575 to 613,712 popular vote margin victory 
over Romney or a 33,863 Obama vote margin.  This margin was certainly one of the major 
explanations for the Obama victory in his home state in 2012. No Republican candidate can 
afford a net loss in the five Collar Counties, much less coming out of the collars with an almost 
34,000 vote deficit. In order to be a viable statewide candidate, a Republican needs to win the 
Collar Counties, and even win by a comfortable margin, in order to have a chance against the 
Democrats.      
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Table 1 
The five Collar Counties, Cook County, and Downstate Contributions 
        
 
 Obama 
votes    
Percent of 
Obama's 
Total   
 Romney 
votes    
Percent of 
Romney's 
Total 
Cook County 
         
1,488,537  
 
49.30 
 
           
495,542  
 
23.21 
        
Five Collar Counties 
            
647,575  
 
21.45 
 
          
613,712  
 
28.74 
        
Downstate 
            
883,400  
 
29.26 
 
      
1,025,962  
 
48.05 
        
Total 
        
3,019,512  
 
100.00 
 
      
2,135,216  
 
100.00 
        The "Collar Counties" are Lake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will.
Source; U.S. Census. 2010. http://quickfacts.census.gov/gfd/states/17/17001.html  
Accessed: Dec. 20, 2012 
 
So, Obama won Cook County by a very wide margin of almost one million votes.  He then took 
the Collar Counties with almost 34,000 vote margin.  This left only Downstate where Romney 
ran much better; however, he did not have enough total votes out of Downstate to come 
anywhere close to winning statewide.  As Table 1 indicates, Romney took an aggregate of 
1,0265,962 total votes from Downstate compared to 883,400 for Obama. This is an advantage 
of 142,562 votes for Romney provided by Downstate. Ordinarily this would not be a bad vote 
margin from Downstate for a Republican candidate.  However, Romney’s Downstate advantage 
was more than counterbalanced by the 1,026,858 vote advantage Obama enjoyed over 
Romney in Cook and the suburban counties. As Table 1 shows, Romney received 48.28 percent 
of his statewide total from Downstate while Obama received only 29.26 percent of his total 
vote from Downstate.    Realistically there are just not enough votes in the 96 Downstate 
Counties for any Republican to make up the deficits Romney sustained in Cook and the five 
Collar Counties.  
Table 2 expands the scope of the inquiry to the fifteen most populated counties in Illinois.  As 
the summary statistics on the table indicate, these fifteen topmost counties are where most of 
the people live in Illinois.  They account for, in total, 10,168,148 of the total of 12,830,632 
people who were counted by the U. S. Census in 2010.  Thus, 79.24 percent of all the Prairie 
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State’s people are found in only fifteen of its one hundred and two total counties.  Of those top 
fifteen, Obama carried ten counties and Romney carried only five.  The behemoth is Cook 
County which accounts for 5,194,675 of the total of almost thirteen million people in the state.  
However, even if one leaves Cook County out of the equation, Obama still enjoyed a 4 to 1 ratio 
over Romney in the fifteen most populated counties (Data taken from U. S. Census, 2010; 
http:/quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17007.html, accessed December 18, 2012).  
Table 2 
Top Fifteen Largest Counties in Illinois 
           
  
  
 2010 
Population    
2012 Presidential 
vote   
 Obama 
Vote    
 Romney 
Vote  
 
 
Cook 
 
     5,194,675  
 
Obama 
 
   1,488,537  
 
       495,542  
 * DuPage 
 
         916,924  
 
Obama 
 
       199,460  
 
       195,046  
 * Lake 
 
         703,462  
 
Obama 
 
       153,757  
 
       129,764  
 * Will 
 
         677,560  
 
Obama 
 
       144,229  
 
       128,969  
 * Kane 
 
         515,269  
 
Obama 
 
         90,332  
 
         88,335  
 * McHenry 
 
         308,760  
 
Romney 
 
         59,797  
 
         71,598  
 
 
Winnebago 
 
         295,266  
 
Obama 
 
         61,732  
 
         55,138  
 
 
St. Clair 
 
         270,056  
 
Obama 
 
         67,285  
 
         50,125  
 
 
Madison 
 
         269,282  
 
Romney 
 
         58,922  
 
         60,608  
 
 
Champaign 
 
         201,081  
 
Obama 
 
         40,831  
 
         35,312  
 
 
Sangamon 
 
         197,465  
 
Romney 
 
         42,107  
 
         50,225  
 
 
Peoria 
 
         186,494  
 
Obama 
 
         40,209  
 
         36,774  
 
 
McLean 
 
         169,572  
 
Romney 
 
         31,883  
 
         39,947  
 
 
Rock Island 
 
         147,546  
 
Obama 
 
         39,157  
 
         24,934  
 
 
Kendall 
 
         114,736  
 
Romney 
 
         22,471  
 
         24,047  
 
           
 
Total: 
 
   10,168,148  
   
   2,540,709  
 
   1,486,364  
 
 
Population Obama Counties 
 
             9,108,333  
     
 
Population Romney Counties 
 
             1,059,815  
     
           * Designates "Collar Counties" 
        
As the table indicates, the ten counties which Obama carried in 2012 account for a total of 
9,108,333 people while the Romney counties only accounted for 1,059,815 people.  In 
summary, approximately ninety percent of the total population in the urban counties lived in 
Obama counties while only ten percent of the population of the urban counties was in the 
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predominantly Romney territory.  You have to descend to the sixth largest county, McHenry, to 
get to the first and largest Romney County, and it is the only one of the Collar Counties to go for 
the Republican.  Next largest is Madison County in the Metro-East area around St. Louis and 
then Sangamon County, home of the state capital, both of which are counties in the circa 
200,000 to 300,000 population range which also provided Romney with a victory. Finally there 
were McLean County in Central Illinois and Kendall County an exurb county in Northeastern 
Illinois which fell into the Romney column and both of these counties were well under 200,000 
in population.   
Table 2 focuses on the fifteen largest counties and details just how severe Romney’s 
disadvantages were in those big counties in Illinois. The larger counties, outside Cook and the 
Collar Counties voted for Obama by 404,597 compared to 377,110 for Romney, or a 27,487 
total advantage to Obama.   When coupled with Obama’s margin in the Cook and the Collar 
Counties displayed in Table 1, you get a popular vote total of 2,540,709 for Obama compared to 
1,486,364 for Romney. Thus, the fifteen largest counties in Illinois provided a net margin of 
1,054,345 for Obama’s total large county vote victory in Illinois in 2012.  
Obviously then, Romney had a major problem in the urban areas although one could argue that 
Obama, likewise, had a problem in the rural areas.  In the presidential sweepstakes, however, it 
is votes and population which ultimately count and the numbers are in the larger cities and 
counties.  The die was cast in the urban counties and there was virtually no way the 
remaining 87 smaller and more rural counties could have overcome that margin which 
favored Obama so heavily no matter how overwhelmingly they voted for Romney.   
In recognition of the fact that Romney won far more counties, and more congressional districts 
that Obama did in 2012, some Republican leaders in states where they control the governor’s 
office and both houses of the legislature are now pushing a plan to allocate that state’s 
Electoral College votes on basis of the congressional district winner.  This is currently the law in 
Maine and Nebraska.  If this were done in large states like Florida, Virginia and Michigan, it 
could significantly tilt the playing field in favor of future Republican presidential candidates.   
While these are only Illinois data, this pattern existed all across the nation. As a matter of gross 
geographic analysis, the central cities and the surrounding metropolitan areas, with some 
exceptions in the suburban South, tended to vote heavily for Obama while the more rural the 
area the more likely it was to vote for Romney.  This urban-rural divide is large and has been 
growing ever since the South broke from the Democratic Party starting in the 1960s and 1970s 
and realigned itself with the Republicans.  This pattern already existed in many parts of the 
Midwest and the West contributing to and reinforcing the national’s partisan and ideological 
polarization trends which have been on the increase for the past two decades.   
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Thus, the rural areas of Illinois provided their votes disproportionately to Governor Romney just 
as they did nationally.  This was not, however, a new voting pattern in Illinois.  In many of the 
rural counties they have been voting for the Republicans and even before that for the Whigs 
since before the Civil War when Abraham Lincoln was still running as a Whig and then running 
as the standard-bearer for the new Republican Party in 1860 and 1864. The red counties on 
Map 2 are where the bedrock strength of the Republican Party has always been in Illinois and 
there is voting continuity going back for generations which is very rarely broken in national or 
state election returns (Key, 1966, chapter 8).  This pattern, too, is a part of the historic voting 
pattern for much of the Midwest which was once a crucial part of the backbone of the 
Republican Party.  These counties provide the foundation for the political continuity which is so 
evident in much of American electoral politics, and particularly in the more rural areas.   
Providing the voting returns at the county level, as Map 2 and Tables 1 and 2 do, helps to make 
the point more graphically. The data are reported to the State Board of Elections by County 
Clerks and other election officials and are readily available for analysis.  However, the point 
goes beyond analytical convenience.  A part of the thesis of this paper is that the counties are 
important political units in Illinois and they constitute a slice of the larger regional political 
culture where the habits and patterns of voting exhibit a high level of consistency and 
continuity from election to election and even generation to generation.  
In fact, counties themselves also have distinct political cultures and histories and these political 
norms make it much more likely that their aggregate voting returns will resemble one another 
across time and elections.    However, there is also room for change especially if they are 
dynamic economically and there is marked in and out migration in the counties and if their 
demographics are changing significantly. It is also true that a strong statewide or national 
candidate can come along occasionally and help disrupt the established voting patterns at the 
county and regional levels especially in high stimulus and high turnout elections.    
Importantly for the future of both parties in Illinois, Obama made serious inroads in suburban 
Cook County and the traditionally Republican Collar Counties around Chicago in 2008 and he 
solidified those gains in 2012. Obama carried Cook County handily and four of the five 
traditional Collar Counties in 2012 even when his statewide totals declined.  From his 2008 
Collar County coalition in 2012 Obama only lost McHenry, which is the far northwest of the 
Collar Counties and home of the exurban voters who have reliably voted Republican even 
though 2008 was an exception when Obama also carried McHenry County. If the Collar 
Counties are trending more Democratic, and these results as well as earlier research published 
in The Simon Review indicate they are, this is an important emerging political development for 
Illinois (Jackson, 2004; Jackson and Gottemoller, 2007).   
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As Colby and Green argued in 1986, Downstate Illinois used to be the key to Illinois as the 
suburbs voted reliably for the Republicans and Central City Chicago voted heavily for the 
Democrats (Colby and Green, 1986).  Today, suburban Cook and the Collar Counties are where 
statewide candidates make it or get broken in Illinois politics. The Collar Counties are growing; 
Central City Chicago has declined as a proportion of the statewide total; and Downstate has 
both growing and declining counties, but on balance it has remained stable as a percentage of 
the total state population.   The suburbs are where most of the growth is and the balance of 
power now resides there in Illinois politics. They have also become more diverse, especially 
because of the influx of new Hispanic residents and other ethnic groups as well.  
Recently the Democrats have made steady gains in those areas.  In 2010 they were the keys to 
the split decision realized by Republican Mark Kirk running for the U. S. Senate and for 
Democrat Pat Quinn running for Governor (Jackson, 2011). Both Senator Kirk and Governor 
Quinn’s victories statewide depended notably on their appeal to the suburbs.  Those split 
decisions were especially powered by the more moderate and Independent and split-ticket 
voters in the Collar Counties. Those areas also significantly boosted the totals for Obama in 
both 2008 and 2012.  
It is evident that the northern and especially the northeastern counties, particularly Cook and 
the Collar Counties, were the backbone of the Obama victory in Illinois because of their size.  
He also carried some counties in the more urban and small city areas, such as Peoria, Rockford, 
and the Quad Cities.  These are areas where labor unions still maintain some political strength 
and some are near to Iowa which was a battleground state with massive television spending 
not present in Illinois otherwise.   
Obama also ran well in St. Clair County which is an urban county in the Metro-East area around 
St. Louis.  There were only two counties in deep southern Illinois, Jackson and Alexander, which 
voted for Obama. Jackson is the home of Southern Illinois University and Alexander has a large 
African-American population.  Those two deep southern counties have been long time bastions 
of strength for the Democratic Party and they did not change their stripes for Romney.   
Otherwise, the other southern Illinois results indicate quite a marked change since this area 
used to be a stronghold for the Democratic Party and very dependable in voting for the 
Democratic candidate for president as well as in statewide offices such as Governor (Leonard, 
2010; Jackson and Leonard, 2011).  Those counties, with the exception of Jackson and 
Alexander, now have gone the same way as the once Solid South.  They are still dependable 
counties for the Democrats in some of the court house offices, but they routinely support 
Republicans for Governor and for President.  
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This bifurcation of party allegiance or “split level” party identification is the same phenomenon 
which was exhibited in the South before its transition into a predominantly one party region 
over the past two decades or so. That is, the formerly loyal white Democrats voted massively 
for the Democrats; then they migrated to be Independent and split-ticket voters, and then 
changed fully into deeply loyal Republican voters, especially in national and state-wide 
elections.   
Elazar’s emphasis on the American South as the home to a “traditionalistic” political culture, 
where deference to established social hierarchy and authority keep the social order stable and 
in power is applicable here and is a part of the dominant political culture in the southern 
sections of the state (Elazar, 1972).  Southern Illinois is becoming more like its neighbors to the 
south rather than transitioning into the recent voting habits typical of the Midwest or its 
neighbors to the north (Jackson and Leonard, 2011).   
Interestingly this emerging affinity for Republican candidates and preference for cultural 
conservatism over labor union loyalty and bread-and-butter economic issues now marks many 
of the counties in southern Illinois just as it is the defining characteristics of politics in the Deep 
South of the old Confederacy.  Culturally much of southern Illinois is now more southern than 
Midwestern in its values and voting habits as much of our public opinion polling data show 
(Leonard, 2010; Jackson and Leonard, 2011). The partisan realignment of much of southern 
Illinois in its presidential and statewide office voting patterns now resembles the realignment of 
the once Solid South from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party which took place in the 
1980s and 1990s and which is now so important in the national Republican Party’s coalition. 
This trend is counterbalanced by the realignment of suburban Cook and the Collar Counties 
which has favored the Democrats.  Those areas, which were once much homogeneous on race, 
class and ethnic grounds are being transformed by the movement of new people, often 
especially Hispanics and other minorities, into those formerly predominantly white suburbs.  As 
that movement has grown, the prospects for the state’s Democratic Party to win in those more 
diverse areas have also grown.   
 
Comparisons of 2012 to 2008 
In Map 3 we examine the 2008 results and then in Map 4 we provide the comparisons by 
county for the Obama versus McCain battle in 2008 and the Obama versus Romney contest in 
2012.  There is both considerable continuity and significant change evident from the 
comparisons of the presidential election results for these two years.       
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Map 3 provides the color coded chart of the county by county returns for Obama versus 
McCain in 2008 (Jackson, 2009).  It shows that Obama carried 46 counties out of the total of 
102 counties, or in other words, Obama carried slightly under half of the counties in Illinois 
that year.  This map shows the 2008 results were much more evenly divided geographically 
between the red and blue counties with almost half of the total geography of the state in either 
camp.  This is more like what one would expect if the home court advantage was especially 
working to Obama’s advantage in 2008 as it was.  In general most Illinois voters of all 
persuasions were proud of their native son and proud of the state for offering the nation the 
potential to elect the first African-American to the lofty position of president of the United 
States.  Undoubtedly there was the familiar partisan division here with the Democrats voting 
very heavily for Obama, and the Republicans voting for their own nominee, John McCain, with 
the Independents split but leaning disproportionately toward Obama.  However, even those 
who did not vote for him tended to think well of Obama in 2008 and the state could proud of its 
history of racial tolerance in its voting habits. For example, Illinois is the only state in the 
modern era to have elected two African Americans, Barack Obama and Carol Mosley Braun to 
be United States Senators with a third, Roland Burris, appointed to that position to fill Obama’s 
remaining term. 
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By 2012, this situation had changed.  The party lines were more prominent and the racial divide 
was overlaid with ideological and geographical divisions.  The old familiar Illinois regionalism 
had returned, and the partisan and ideological polarization had hardened in the fires of political 
conflict which marked Obama’s first term in the White House.  While Illinois by a sizable 
majority stayed in the Obama column, Map 4 shows the geographical distribution of the vote 
for Obama versus Romney and then provides an overlay of the Obama versus McCain results. 
As is evident from Map 4, Obama only carried a total of 23 counties in 2012 as compared to 
46 in 2008.  In other words in 2012 he lost half of the counties, or 23 counties he had carried 
in 2008.  Map 4 documents those counties graphically.  In general most of them are in central 
and northern Illinois. Two of the Obama losses also were in the traditional Democratic 
strongholds of Gallatin and Pulaski in southern Illinois.  Those counties where Obama lost the 
presidential race in his home state in 2012 are mostly the competitive or swing counties and 
some are traditionally Republican counties which he was able to attract temporarily in 2008 but 
was not able to hold onto in 2012. Undoubtedly this loss was due in large part to the impact the 
Great Recession had on Illinois as a state and to the toll it took on the president’s support and 
job approval in Illinois and the nation after almost four years in office. 
Nevertheless, although Obama lost ground, he obviously did not lose the overall election in 
Illinois in 2012.  Indeed, he won rather handily taking 58.57 percent of the Illinois two-party 
vote.  Clearly geography is less important than population, and the larger the county in 
population the more likely they were to vote for Obama in Illinois and nationally.  Of course, 
the reciprocal of that relationship is also true with the smaller and more rural the county, the 
more likely it was to vote for Mitt Romney in 2012.  That population based correlation has 
been true in every election of the 21st Century starting with Bush versus Gore in 2000 and 
extending through Bush versus Kerry in 2008 and Obama versus McCain in 2008.   
This is not an entirely new phenomenon, but it is one of relatively recent origins extending only 
as far back as the recent realignment of our national political alliances.  This correlation 
between the rural/urban division in this country and its aggregate voting behavior has been 
true in presidential politics ever since the nation underwent a partisan realignment that started 
in the 1950s and 1960s and intensified in the 1970s and 1980s.  This was when the South left its 
traditional home in the Democratic Party and over the course of about two decades migrated 
into becoming as dependable a part of the Republican Party’s core constituency as the Solid 
South had been for the Democrats from the Civil War era until the 1970s.  This is one of the 
most important changes in American politics in the last 150 years since the Republicans were 
founded in the period of 1854 through 1860.   
That realignment is complete at the national level and its contours are now evident in the 
Illinois presidential voting returns presented in Map 3 and Map 4 just as they are in the national 
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returns available in other sources. That is, the Republican candidate won handily all across 
southern Illinois in both 2008 and 2012.  In 2012 Romney won heavily in the rural areas of 
central and northern Illinois where Republicans had always been strong although some of those 
counties had strayed over to vote for Obama instead of McCain in 2008.   
Indeed, this national realignment may reflect a larger and almost universal political norm.  That 
is, the rural areas in virtually all developed nations, and often even underdeveloped areas, are 
usually more traditional, more conservative, more parochial, and more likely to support the 
parties of the right or the more conservative political parties than the urban areas are (Almond 
and Verba, 1965; Almond and Coleman,1960; Bishop, 2008).  Thus, what is true in the United 
States in the first part of the 21st Century is also true and has been for generations in other 
nations where people have been given the right to vote for their leaders in free elections.     
One of the objectives of this paper is to unravel some of the important explanation for the 
geographic differences which have been quite evident in American presidential politics.  These 
differences are a fundamental part of what divides politics in Illinois and they are also endemic 
to the divisive and polarized politics now faced routinely in the nation as a whole.  In Table 3 we 
explore some of the possible independent variables which differentiate the typically Republican 
counties from the typically Democratic counties and differentiate both from the swing counties 
which provide the potential for change from election to election. These variables include: the 
2010 population of the county, the percent white, percent Black, percent Hispanic, median 
home value, per capita income, median house-hold income, and percent below the poverty 
rate for each county.   
The post-mortems on the 2012 presidential election featured demographic variables and 
demographic changes and trends prominently as important popular explanations for why 
Obama was re-elected and how he was able to fashion a comfortable victory which was 
apparently very surprising to many political analysts, as well as to the Romney campaign itself.  
Most prominently featured was the changing racial and ethnic make-up of the United States.  
The day after the election analysts started focusing more intently on the reduced size of the 
white electorate, the importance of growth in the Hispanic population, and the unexpectedly 
large rate of turnout for African-American and younger voters.  All of these are typically 
important explanations for voting behavior which go all the way back to the classic American 
Voter research from the early 1950s (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1956) and to the 
classic Columbia University research team’s results from the early and mid-1940s (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954).  So, journalists and scholars alike have been using the major 
demographic categories as personal characteristic explanations, or at least significant correlates 
of the vote for the many decades since.   
22 
 
However, this is largely an individual level of analysis explanation.  We are using a somewhat 
different approach when we utilize the county as the unit of analysis and we have to be careful 
not to over interpret the demographic correlations.  However, the basic argument of this paper, 
like many others in this tradition, is that the county, or any other aggregate data level of 
analysis, can provide important indicators of the geographic milieu and the political culture 
context in which individual voters live and work. This argument is spelled out in an earlier work 
in more detail and with significant data provided on the partisanship of county level officials for 
the period of 1975 through 2010 (Jackson, 2011).  Thus, this voting behavior tradition, which 
goes all the way back to the seminal work of V. O. Key, is also an important adjunct to our 
understanding of our state or the nation’s politics (Key, 1949, 1955, 1966).  That is the approach 
taken in Table 3.   
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Table 3 
Demographics of Presidential Vote by County Political Reward 
         
 
2010 
Population 
Percent 
White 
Percent 
Black 
Percent 
Hispani
c 
 Median 
Home 
Value  
 Per 
Capita 
Income  
 Median 
Household 
Income  
Percen
t 
below 
Povert
y 
         Counties 
Won by 
Obama in 
2012 also 
won by 
Obama in 
2008    415,933  85.8 9.4 8.9  $143,987  
 $  
25,993  
 $       
51,519  14.0 
         Counties 
Carried by 
Obama in 
2008 and 
Lost by 
Obama in 
2012      82,111  93.2 6.6 5.8  $117,448  
 $  
24,605   $ 49,732  14.1 
         Counties 
won by 
Romney in 
2012 and 
by McCain 
in 2008      24,653  93.7 2.9 2.2  $  92,470  
 $  
22,932   $   46,696  12.5 
          
Scholars and political analysts have been predicting an ideological and partisan realignment of 
American politics for generations (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1975; Phillips, 1969; Judis and Teixeria, 
2002). Partisan realignments are constituted by both individual and aggregate, or cohort group 
changes which in total constitute a net shift from one political party to the other.  Or 
alternatively, there is a net shift which leaves the same party in the majority; however, it is a 
new and differently constituted majority coalition.  That is the short hand version of the shift in 
voting allegiance that took place in recent American politics. 
Table 3 starts with the racial and ethnic compositions of the Illinois counties as they are divided 
into the three types of election results provided by the 2008 versus 2010 presidential results. 
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First, and most importantly, the consistently loyal Democratic counties were the large 
counties with an average 2010 population of 415,933, while the consistently loyal Republican 
counties, that is, those which voted for both McCain in 2008 and Romney in 2012 were the 
smaller counties with an average population of only 24,653 people.  The swing or more 
marginal counties which voted for Obama in 2008 and for Romney in 2012 fit neatly in-between 
with an average population of 82,111.  
As expected the Obama counties in 2008 and 2010 are much more diverse racially and 
ethnically than the Romney and McCain counties are.  That is, those consistently loyal 
Democratic counties which voted for Obama in both 2012 and 2008 were 85.8 percent white, 
9.4 percent black, and 8.9 percent Hispanic. Those which were consistently Republican, voting 
for both John McCain and Mitt Romney were also much more homogeneous with 93.7 percent 
white, 2.9 percent black, and only 2.2 percent Hispanic.  Those which split between voting for 
Obama in 2008 but voting for Romney in 2012 again fell neatly in between. They were 93.2  
percent white, 6.6 percent black, and 5.8 percent Hispanic.  In the social sciences one rarely 
encounters empirical data where the pattern is clearer than that found in Table 3.   
These aggregate level demographic results were certainly consonant with the national picture 
and the analysis provided from the exit poll data provided by the national news organizations 
(See for example:  The Economist , November 10, 2012, 27-29; The Washington Post, 
http;/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-exit-polls/accessed, January 18, 
2013).  Those post-mortems stressed the racial and ethnic diversity of the Obama coalition and 
how much his victory depended on the votes of those who in the past typically turned out at 
lower rates and how well he ran among the black and brown voters while losing white voters by 
a substantial margin.  The turnout rate and the much vaunted Obama ground game were given 
widespread credit for mobilizing the vote at historic levels among these populations in 2008 
and then matching and in some states exceeding those levels again in 2012.   
Another set of important demographic and socio-economic variables are those provided by 
income, housing stock, and poverty rate data.  These too are provided for the 2012 and 2008 
results in Table 3.  It is quite clear here that the median home value is highest in the 
consistently Obama counties, second highest in the counties Obama carried only in 2008, and 
lowest in the Romney counties.  Likewise, median household income and per capita income 
exhibited the same pattern. The affluent counties were also the Obama Counties, and the 
next most affluent counties were the swing counties.  The least prosperous counties, as 
measured by median home value, per capita income and median household income, were also 
the most loyal Republican Counties. (See Appendix B, C, and D for the data on each county).   
 The only minor variation on this overall pattern was in the percent below the poverty level 
which was highest (at 14.1 percent) in the 2008 to 2012 swing counties, then next highest in the 
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consistently Democratic Counties (at 14.0 percent) and lowest (at 12.5 percent) in the 
consistently Republican Counties.  These differences are not great on the percent below 
poverty indicator; however, as an overview they may indicate that consistently Republican 
counties also have fewer people at the very lower end of the socio-economic scale, i.e. below 
the poverty line.  It may also suggest that the most affluent counties are also those with the 
greatest income gaps (what the economists call the gini coefficient) and counter-intuitively they 
are also the areas most likely to vote for the Democrats at the aggregate level (McCarty, Poole 
and Rosenthal, 2006). That is certainly the case with Cook and some of the Collar Counties.    
To recap, the richer and better housed counties and those with the highest per capita incomes 
and highest median household income levels were also more likely to vote for Obama, and the 
opposite is true for the Republican counties in both 2008 and 2012.  Of course, this does not fit 
the popular stereotypes that the Democrats are the party of the dependent populations, and 
the Republicans are the party of the more prosperous and the wealthier people and areas.  
This stereotype was reinforced somewhat during the presidential campaign when Romney in a 
speech to an affluent audience at a $50,000 per ticket fundraiser in an up-scale enclave in 
Florida talked about the “47%”who were dependent of governmental programs and not 
persuadable to vote for him.  This perspective is often capsulized in some of the media as “the 
makers and the takers” who are supposed to mark the differences between the Republican and 
the Democratic Party, but that is a vastly over stretched stereotype.   
In addition, there are certainly predominantly rich areas and poor areas of the nation as well as 
in the state of Illinois and those geographic differences have implications for public policy 
making.  It tends to be also true in Illinois that the rich areas disproportionately support the 
state’s activities and public services which are more often needed and utilized in the poorer 
areas.   
As Gelman’s research at the national level shows, this transfer of income and wealth results 
from the formula used in various governmental programs which tend to emphasize need and 
ability to pay.  This results in a national transfer of payments from what is generally called the 
“blue states” to the “red states” which tend to be poorer at the aggregate level and filled with 
more poor people individually. Gelman says the following in terms of his national findings:  
At the state level, Democrats’ willingness to tax high earners and Republicans’ 
motivation to spend in poor states combine to yield large transfers from mostly 
Democratic states in the Northeast, Midwest, and West Coast to mostly Republican 
states in the South and middle of the country.  According to the Tax Foundation, the 
poorest ten states (all of which George W. Bush carried in 2004) receive an average of 
$1.60 in federal spending for every $1.00 they spend in federal taxes, while the richest 
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ten states (nine of which were won by John Kerry) receive only $0.80 on average 
(Gelman, 2008, 62).   
Other studies have consistently shown the same disparities in tax raising and spending patterns.  
What is true nationally is also true of transfers from the rich to the poorer areas in Illinois 
whether those poorer areas are on the south side of Chicago or in southern Illinois (Legislative 
Research Unit, 1989).   Thus, what is happening in the suburban parts of Cook County and the 
five Collar Counties is particularly important in explaining Illinois politics.   
Part of untangling the puzzle of the findings presented in Table 3 is rooted in the use of 
aggregate versus individual level data. The analyst must be careful to avoid what statisticians 
call the “ecological fallacy” or the inferring of individual level data from aggregate results 
(Kramer, 1983).  However, there is plenty of individual level survey and poll data to confirm the 
correlation between socio-economic factors and voting. The basic generalization is that the 
higher the socio-economic class, the more likely one is to vote Republican.   Individual level 
voting data consistently show that here are clearly tens of millions of poor, working class and 
middle class people who vote for the Democrats; however, although they are not as numerous 
there are also millions of the same categories who vote for the Republicans.  There are millions 
of comfortable and even rich Democrats just as is also true for the Republicans.  
However, the argument of this paper and any analysis which takes advantage of aggregate data 
is that the geographic context also matters to voters. If you take the aggregate level of analysis 
provided by the county level of data, it is also clear that the geographic location and the 
demographic characteristics of their communities are important in providing the context of 
where the voters live, work and recreate. This life-style context is also important for their 
politics influencing who their neighbors are, where they work, where they go for recreation and 
go to church and their views on a wide variety of political and social issues.  In general like-
minded people and those with similar economic status tend to cluster together geographically  
(Brooks,2004; Bishop,2008).      
Gelman describes the seemingly paradoxical nature of the individual versus aggregate level 
results in the following terms: 
Rich people in rich states are socially and economically more liberal than rich people in 
poor states….What’s new is polarization- the increasingly ideological nature of 
politics…the paradox is that polarization is going in one direction for voters and the 
other direction for states.  The resolution of the paradox is that the more polarized 
playing field has driven rich conservative voters in poor states toward the Republicans 
and rich liberals in rich states toward the Democrats, thus turning the South red and 
New England and the West Coast blue and setting up a national map that is divided by 
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culture rather than class, with blue-collar West Virginia moving from solidly 
Democratic…to safely Republican and suburban Connecticut going the other way 
(Gelman, 2008, 4).  
The dynamic Gelman describes derived from state level data also persists when the focus is 
shifted to the county level in Illinois, and it illustrates some of the same party realigning trends 
at the local level. Why is that cultural context so important and so much a part of the every-day 
world of average voters? 
Rural communities are just intrinsically different, in many ways that are politically important, 
from the urban areas.  People live in close proximity in the cities, and they tend to rub elbows 
much more frequently and much more closely than those in the rural areas. They see public 
services and public servants on a more up close and personal basis.   The urbanite is more likely 
to be aware of the dependence they have on governmental goods and services and to see 
those services around them daily.  Everything from keeping law and order on the streets, to 
clearing the snow when the blizzards come, to operating the elevated or underground mass 
transit systems on which millions depend to get to work or school are pretty clearly provided by 
the government, and the supporting revenues have to be raised to pay for them.   
Rural communities and their inhabitants almost live in a different world from their urban 
counterparts.  Sometimes it seems that the two populations may inhabit different political 
planets.  Rural dwellers are much more likely to take the concept of American individualism and 
“American  Exceptionalism” more personally (Kingdon, 1999).  They are more likely to believe 
themselves to be dependent on no one and to be more isolated from the trends and intrusions 
of the global economy and the modern culture.   
This may not be objectively true, as they and their jobs may well be dependent on the tides of 
the global economy which beset workers universally today no matter where they live; however, 
the rural resident is likely to believe that they are more independent and they do not have to 
stand on the metro subway platform before taking the train to work each day. Driving a pickup 
truck alone twenty five miles to work each day is a different experience.  The path may be over 
city, county, or state roads and highways, but the lesson of dependence on the government for 
this service is not as direct or obvious. Going duck or quail hunting or fishing in a stock pond is 
different from enjoying nature in the confines of Chicago’s Grant Park or walking along Lake 
Michigan’s shore line. The cultural context is constantly reinforced by daily contacts and 
personal interactions with peers, family and friends which tend to lead in a more conservative 
direction.   
Studies show that issues related to guns and gun control are particularly salient in the rural and 
small town areas of the U. S. Rural dwellers are much more likely to value their guns and to 
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regard proposals for gun control to be anathema to them and to be something that urban 
legislators are trying to unfairly foist off on a resistive rural population.  This has been 
particularly true in Illinois recently where the politics of gun control is a decidedly 
geographically based fight.  The rural residents and their representatives in the General 
Assembly and in the Congress are staunch, even vehement advocates for the Second 
Amendment and resist fiercely the various gun control measures which tend to emanate from 
Chicago and which receive significant support from the legislators who represent suburban 
Chicago.  The battle over “concealed carry”, which found Illinois as the last holdout against 
making concealed carry legal until a recent federal appellate court decision ordered the General 
Assembly to fashion a change to the law, divides the state regionally and geographically more 
than perhaps any other issue.   
In addition, religion also divides the state and the nation in basic ways which are important 
politically and which add to the ideological and partisan polarization which has developed in the 
past two decades.  It is well known in voting behavior that religious identification, and 
especially frequency of church attendance, are important independent variables explaining 
voting behavior (Flanigan and Zingale, 2006, 113-115 ).  While there are certainly “mega-
churches” in the cities, the kinds of religious fervor and fundamentalism which have become 
important components of the Republican coalition are more often found in rural and small 
town America than in the cities (Putnam and Campbell, 2010).  Conversely, the secularism and 
cosmopolitan religious values and world views more often found in the cities are much more 
likely to mark people who vote for the Democrats than for the Republicans (Wilcox, 2000; 
Gelman, 2008, 78-79).  
This is why the kinds of diversity documented in Table 3  is important in unraveling what is 
taking place in the geographical, socio-economic and demographic polarization of American 
politics and this case study of Illinois provides some important indicators of those larger 
national trends (Hetherington, 2001).    
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Map 5 extends the analysis back in time through the 2004 and 2000 presidential elections and 
offers a comparison between those first two elections in the 21st century with the 2008 and 
2012 results presented in Map 4.  These longitudinal results provide a picture of mostly stability 
at the county level; however, it also allows us to identify the most competitive counties where 
change from election to election is evident and to note where perhaps more permanent 
realignment could be taking place in these swing counties. 
As is evident from Map 5 there are only 13 counties that consistently voted for the Democratic 
candidate for president in all four elections between 2000 and 2012. Cook County, again, is by 
far the biggest and most important of these loyal Democratic counties.  Three of the deep blue 
counties are in southern Illinois and the metro East area and the rest are in northwestern 
Illinois, near the Iowa border and notably also include Champaign County in central Illinois, the 
home of the state’s largest public university.   There are 54 counties which have voted 
consistently for the Republicans extending from George W. Bush in 2000 through Mitt Romney 
in 2012. These counties extend across much of central Illinois, much of southeastern and 
southwestern Illinois and to deep southern Illinois, and included an island of Ogle and Lee 
Counties in far northern Illinois.  In addition, the swing counties, which were mostly Republican 
except for the Obama aberration in 2008, were mostly concentrated in northern and central 
Illinois. 
This is by far the larger geographic region of the state taken as a whole and would appear to be 
a problem for the Democrats if one takes the county level and its importance for party building 
seriously, as I do.  In addition, these counties constitute the most fertile ground for electing 
state legislators.  These are the counties where you frequently find the Republicans controlling 
the State Senate and State House seats for generations no matter who they run.  However, on 
statewide election returns, as we have already seen above, the prospects for the Republicans 
are not so promising.  The loyal Democratic Counties include Cook and some of the other 
bigger counties with a total population of 6,246,565.  Even without Cook County, the loyal 
Democratic Counties have a total population of 1,051,890.  See Appendix E.   
The 54 consistently loyal Republican counties include most of the smaller counties in Illinois as 
well as a few medium sized ones; however, Tazwell (Pekin) is the only county over 100,000 in 
population in the group. The next largest are Adams (Quincy) and Williamson (Marion) at 67 
and 66 thousand respectively. The total population of the loyal Republican counties comes to 
1,318,134.   See Appendix F.   Thus, the population differentials leave the Democrats in a clearly 
advantageous position among the most loyal counties when the statewide election returns are 
counted. When one examines the most competitive or the  “swing counties” which include all 
the Collar Counties, that is where the great majority of the state’s population, outside Cook 
County lives, as we have already stressed in the earlier population data. While the Collar 
31 
 
Counties have been very Republican historically, they are becoming more diverse and 
sometimes provide a majority vote for statewide Democratic candidates or help swing the 
election for them.  Again the real balance of power now resides in suburban Cook and the 
Collar Counties as noted earlier.   
There was one additional county, Madison, where the Democrats won the first three 
presidential elections of this century; however, it changed from Obama in 2008 to Romney in 
2012. It is the only county in the state with this particular record.  Madison County is a county 
in the Metro-East area and has been growing as something of a bedroom community for St. 
Louis and St. Louis County which is just across the Mississippi River, and it has become an 
“exurban” county for metropolitan St. Louis.  Perhaps not surprisingly it resembles other outer 
ring suburban counties in its movement toward the Republicans and away from Obama in 2012. 
The other two deviant cases are Franklin and Perry County in deep southern Illinois.  They both 
voted for Al Gore in 2000, and then that was the end of their loyalty to the national Democrats.  
These two counties were formerly strongholds of the Democratic Party and had been a part of 
the southern Illinois bedrock for the Democrats virtually since the Civil War.  However, as was 
explored above, parts of southern Illinois are in a realigning process which will be explored in 
more detail in the next section of this paper.  These two counties still have some Democrats left 
at the Court House; however, they have not voted for the party’s national standard bearer since 
Al Gore ran in 2000 and they did not vote for the Democrat for Governor in 2010.  This is very 
similar to what has happened in the southern states which make up the Old Confederacy.   
 
Implications for Realignment 
The New Deal Coalition which originally was glued together by President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
in the wake of the Great Depression dominated American politics from the 1930s easily into the 
1960s, and arguably there were echoes of it being still intact and supporting the election of 
Jimmy Carter in 1976.  However, the old New Deal Coalition was inherently unstable.  It 
contained almost equal parts of the liberal base in the Northeastern, Midwestern and Western 
cities aligned with the most conservative elements in the nation found in the South, and 
especially in the rural South. It contained union members and union bosses who had to live 
with and a find modus vivendi with what V. O. Key called “the big mules” of southern politics, 
the planters, business owners and extractive industries owners and operators who were 
virulently anti-union and pro Right-to-Work laws (Key, 1949).   
Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s this coalition contained the inchoate and increasingly 
assertive civil rights movement, originally grounded in the black churches and in such liberal 
unions as the United Auto Workers, the United Mine Workers, the Laborers, and the 
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Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. These unions and the civil rights leaders increasingly faced 
off against the most segregationist public officials, especially the southern Governors like Orval 
Faubus, Ross Barnett, Lester Maddox, and especially George Wallace who were both racists and 
vehemently opposed to unions and protective of their state’s Right-to-Work laws all of which 
constituted a coherent public policy package for these governors and their allies in the state 
legislatures. 
These were inherent contradictions in Roosevelt’s New Deal coalition which could no longer be 
papered over and contained.  As the civil right leaders and their foot soldiers in the field 
demonstrated, marched and attacked the very structure of state supported segregation, the 
walls of American apartheid began to give way and later fell.  Along with that fall, the New Deal 
Coalition crumbled and had to be reassembled with different components, and the whole 
American party structure went through a fundamental transition that culminated in the 
partisan realignment and the deep partisan polarization that undergirds all of American politics, 
and especially American presidential and congressional politics in the second decade of the 21st 
Century.   
The Obama Coalition (or it could be termed the  “Clinton-Obama” coalition since it started with 
Bill Clinton’s presidency) has some of the key elements of the old Roosevelt Coalition, i.e. a 
base in the cities and the unions, the “symbol specialists” who work in the media and the 
creative arts, and many upper-middle and upper-class people who work in knowledge based 
jobs in what Judis and Teixeria call the “ideopolis” (Judis and Teixeria, 2002).  In their 
provocative book, The Emerging Democratic Majority, published just over a decade ago Judis 
and Teixeira applied their concept to Illinois in the following geographic terms: 
Across the entire state, the Democrats’ gains in Illinois are almost exclusively in the 
state’s ideopolises….Fortunately for the Democrats, the state’s growth has been 
concentrated in the ideopolis counties.  The greatest increases in population during the 
1990s came (in this order) in the four ideopolis counties of Cook, DuPage, Lake, and Will.  
If this continues, the Democrats’ hold over bellwether Illinois looks secure for the early 
twenty-first century (Judis and Teixeria, 2002, 103). 
The demographic and political developments in Illinois during the first twelve years of the 21st 
Century clearly support their thesis.  The two presidential victories for Obama in 2008 and 2012 
also seem to support their predictions for national politics.  Only the continued Republican 
control of the U. S. House of Representatives points in the opposite direction.  The House is 
particularly defined by the distribution of the population, and gives a structural edge to the 
Republicans which coupled with the Republican victories in the state legislatures in 2010 gave 
them a real advantage in the redistricting process attendant the 2010 Census.   
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This advantage, in turn, helped the Republicans continue their control of a majority of the 
House in 2012 in spite of it being a very good year for the Democrats overall and a year in which 
they won  more popular votes in total than the Republicans did.  It also should be noted that 
the Democrats gained a net of four new House seats in Illinois in the 2012 elections, and this 
resulted from the advantage the Illinois Democrats enjoyed in 2011 of controlling the 
redistricting process just as the Republicans did in some thirty of the other states.  So, in this 
sense, the Democrats in Illinois were isolated from the national trends by their locally and 
geographically based strength in the state’s General Assembly which translated into a marked 
Democratic advantage in the Illinois House delegation.   
So, in 2012 the Democrats and Barack Obama prospered nationally and nowhere was that 
prosperity more evident than in Obama’s home state of Illinois.  Obama put together a national 
coalition which carried him to a resounding electoral victory in 2008 which was then reaffirmed 
with his re-election, albeit by a narrower margin, in 2012.  In the wake of the 2012 results 
which were so disappointing from a Republican perspective, there was much soul-searching 
and much analysis devoted to trying to redirect the party’s future and map a path back to a 
more competitive electoral strategy.  The Democrats were making their own long term strategic 
plans, and a part of it had to be based in geography and driven by changing demographics 
(Rothenberg, 2012).                                                     
In national terms the Clinton-Obama Coalition has lost a key element of the old Roosevelt 
Coalition, the white South, which made it so unwieldy and so internally contradictory from its 
inception.  In other words, the new Democratic Coalition, assembled first by Bill Clinton, and 
then mobilized and re-energized by Barack Obama is much more stable and more coherent 
ideologically and issue-wise than the New Deal Coalition was. The same is true of the modern 
Republican Coalition which opposes it. The two adversarial coalitions are now deeply 
entrenched, and ideological and geographical polarization is what marks 21st Century American 
politics (Gelman, 2008; Levensdusky, 2009; McCarthy, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2008; Fiorina, 
2005).   
Illinois has been in the forefront of that transition, providing significant leadership and serving 
as a proving ground for some of its major policy initiatives.  Illinois, like the nation as a whole is 
now divided and deeply polarized The state epitomizes much of what has happened and  is 
happening in American politics at the grassroots level.  This study, especially grounded in the 
basic electoral maps of Illinois shows the contours of those changes, and the underlying 
continuity which conditions and shapes those changes as graphically as any other state in the 
union could.   The fact that Illinois is also the home state of President Barack Obama simply 
makes the story even more interesting and compelling as our state history is a microcosm of 
the nation’s history since the turn of the century.   
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Conclusion 
At the end of the 2009 paper on Barack Obama’s victory in the presidential election of 2008, I 
wrote the following words about the trends in Illinois and nationally.  The same words seem 
even more apt now in the wake of a 2012 presidential election where the demographics of a 
changing America seemed to be the major theoretical explanation for why Obama won more 
handily than many observers thought possible and why the Democrats were able to expand 
their margins in the U. S. Senate, and pick up a net of eight seats in the House even though that 
level of Democratic success seemed quite improbable going into the election. 
Part of the thesis of this paper is that the changes in the electoral map may be 
the wave of the future for Illinois politics and they may also be a metaphor for the larger 
demographic and political trends which mark the transitions underway in the nation at 
large.  Most notably for this thesis, the whole segment of northeastern Illinois is where 
most of the people in the state live.  It is the fastest growing section of Illinois, and it all 
went for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2008.  This conversion of the Collar 
Counties has been underway for some time now in Illinois politics; however, it has been 
reinforced and accelerated by the 2008 election.  As the suburban counties, along with 
Cook County outside the city become more and more heterogeneous, they are also 
becoming more Democratic.  Those fast growing metropolitan areas, like the rest of 
urban America, are now the home of a much more racially and ethnically mixed 
population and they make their livings in a wide variety of ways not always associated 
with the traditional economic base of the older more homogeneous and more 
prosperous view of the suburbs left over from the 1950s and 1960s.  Consequently, the 
suburban ring around Chicago is no longer the predictably deliverable base of the 
statewide Republican Party that it was [previously] (Jackson, 2009, 11-12). 
We now have the advantage of four more years of observation and two state elections and two 
national elections to provide additional perspective since those words were written.  We also 
have the advantage of the data provided by the 2010 U. S. Census.  All the demographic trends, 
both nationally and in Illinois, are in the same direction presaged by the observations written in 
2009.  That is, the diversity of the United States, and of the State of Illinois, continues to grow.  
Racial and ethnic minorities made up a larger proportion, and white voters made up a smaller 
proportion of the 2012 electorate than at any time in history.   
To be sure, white voters still constituted 72 percent of the national total and they voted for 
Romney over Obama by a 59 to 39 percent margin.  However, that vastly disproportionate 
racial margin was not enough and the combination of African-Americans (93% Obama); 
Hispanic Americans (71 percent Obama), Asian-Americans (73 percent Obama), young voters, 
18-29  (60 percent Obama), and women voters (55 percent Obama) was just too much for 
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Romney and the Republicans to overcome in spite of the fact that the kind of advantage they 
enjoyed among white voters would have been sufficient for a comfortable national victory in 
past elections (The Economist, using CNN exit poll, November 10, 2012, 27-29; Washington 
Post, http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-exit-polls/ accessed January 18, 
2013).   
This, of course, has led to a lot of soul-searching on the part of the Republican Party with regard 
to what they should do about losing the presidential election and the U. S. Senate in face of 
their very high and very genuine expectations that they were going to win (For just one of many 
examples see: Rothenberg, December 19, 2012).  This unexpected loss was doubly hard to take 
for many of their supporters and their interest group base since the total spent to defeat 
Obama alone is projected to reach approximately one billion dollars.  So, one might well ask, 
and many Republican donors are asking, what did they get for their investment of tens of 
millions of dollars in these campaigns?  Will they be as ready next time to spring into action 
with major campaign funds for whoever the Republican nominee turns out to be?   In addition, 
the 2014 mid-term elections are looming and the candidates for both parties will be almost 
completely settled by the end of 2013.  Which party will have the better talking points as they 
try to convince first-tier candidates to run for the competitive and open seats in Congress, a 
decision which has to be made by December of 2013 in most states.   
The electoral clock on politics in the United States and in Illinois never stops.  A sterling victory, 
like the one scored by Obama and the Senate Democrats on November 6th, 2012 is enough to 
give the Democrats something to build on for 2014 and 2016.  However, the Republicans still 
control the U. S. House by a 234 to 201 margin. Since part of that margin is due to the fact that 
growing out of their 2010 mid-term election victories the Republicans controlled the remap 
process in 30 states and thus were able to ensure friendly Republican maps for much of the 
next decade and they also control 30 out of the 50 Governorships.  
Those are firm foundations for a Republican renaissance in either 2014 or 2016.  They can also 
take comfort in the fact that the party which holds the White House almost always loses some 
seats in the Congress in the midterm elections, and this trend is more marked in the second 
term of a sitting president than in the first term.  However, the Republicans must sort out some 
of the basic questions about their message, the audience they plan to court, their most 
important policy positions and their perceived appeal to the more reactionary elements of 
American society especially those located in the South and in some of the more rural areas of 
the county.  In order to broaden their base the Republicans cannot continue to narrow their 
focus to the loyal core that carried George W. Bush to the White House, narrowly, in 2000 and 
2004. To do so invites continued electoral losses.   
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Demographics may not be destiny entirely in American politics, but it goes a long way toward 
charting the political course for the nation’s future.  Contrary to some of the post-election 
commentary, it is not stylistic matters that dog the Republican Party among the groups they 
lost so badly in 2008 and 2012. Speaking to the voters more gently and more diplomatically is 
not enough to change their voting proclivities although some style points among some of the 
more unenlightened members of the Republican Party also hurt their cause in several crucial 
Senate races.   
However, those candidates expressing their retrograde views were mostly reflecting issue and 
values-based positions they genuinely and fervently advocated.  It is primarily substance and 
policy rather than cosmetics that really matters.  This is the major challenge the Republicans 
have to deal with as they try to chart both their immediate future heading into the 2014 mid-
term elections and as they inevitably start to handicap their various presidential nomination 
favorites for 2016.   
The pendulum usually swings, and in time the out party becomes the in-party. That cycle may 
also hold true for 2016.  It is widely recognized that it is very difficult for one party to win three 
presidential elections consecutively in the United States, and the Republicans will have an 
advantage in 2016; however, such an electoral swing is not inevitable.  Nothing in politics ever 
is.  It takes rational thought and strategic planning, something both parties will need to engage 
in assiduously if they are going to solidify their base and reach out to independents and attract 
new supporters in the near future.  It is a planning effort devoted to building their future and 
trying to ensure their party’s success and continuity that should occupy most of the attention of 
the leaders of both parties, in Illinois and nationally, and that planning is reinforced best by 
winning elections.  That is why 2012 was so important for the Democrats and Republicans alike,  
and why they will need to plan very strategically for the party building and party branding steps 
they take in preparation for 2014 and 2016.  
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Appendix A 
Illinois Counties Votes for President in 2012 
     
 
Votes for Obama Votes for Romney Percent for Obama Percent for Romney 
Adams                          9,648                         20,416  31.5 66.7 
Alexander                          1,965                           1,487  56.1 42.5 
Bond                          3,020                           4,095  41.2 55.8 
Boone                          9,883                         11,096  46.3 51.9 
Brown                              787                           1,513  33.3 64.0 
Bureau                          8,134                           8,164  48.9 49.1 
Calhoun                          1,080                           1,440  41.9 55.9 
Carroll                          3,665                           3,555  49.6 48.1 
Cass                          2,053                           2,707  42.2 55.7 
Champaign                        40,831                         35,312  51.9 44.9 
Christian                          5,494                           8,885  37.3 60.3 
Clark                          2,591                           5,144  33.0 65.4 
Clay                          1,584                           4,190  26.8 70.9 
Clinton                          5,596                         10,524  34.0 63.9 
Coles                          9,262                         11,631  43.4 54.5 
Cook                  1,488,537                      495,542  74.0 24.6 
Crawford                          2,858                           5,585  33.1 64.7 
Cumberland                          1,641                           3,509  31.0 66.3 
DeKalb                        21,207                         18,934  51.6 46.1 
De Witt                          2,601                           4,579  35.4 62.3 
Douglas                          2,430                           5,334  30.8 67.5 
DuPage                      199,460                      195,046  49.7 48.6 
Edgar                          2,565                           5,132  32.8 65.6 
Edwards                              754                           2,405  23.4 74.5 
Effingham                          3,861                         12,501  23.2 75.2 
Fayette                          2,853                           5,951  31.7 66.0 
Ford                          1,656                           4,229  27.5 70.2 
Franklin                          7,254                         10,267  40.5 57.3 
Fulton                          8,328                           6,632  54.2 43.2 
Gallatin                          1,029                           1,492  40.0 58.0 
Greene                          2,023                           3,451  36.0 61.4 
Grundy                          9,451                         11,343  44.5 53.4 
Hamilton                          1,269                           2,566  32.2 65.1 
Hancock                          3,650                           5,271  40.1 57.9 
Hardin                              742                           1,535  31.8 65.9 
Henderson                          1,978                           1,541  55.4 43.2 
Henry                        12,332                         11,583  50.5 47.5 
Iroquois                          3,413                           9,120  26.7 71.3 
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Jackson                        13,319                           9,864  55.5 41.1 
Jasper                          1,436                           3,514  28.5 69.7 
Jefferson                          6,089                           9,811  37.3 60.1 
Jersey                          3,667                           6,039  36.8 60.6 
Jo Daviess                          5,667                           5,534  49.6 48.4 
Johnson                          1,572                           3,963  27.7 69.9 
Kane                        90,332                         88,335  49.7 48.6 
Kankakee                        21,595                         23,136  47.3 50.7 
Kendall                        22,471                         24,047  47.4 50.7 
Knox                        13,451                           9,408  57.6 40.3 
Lake                      153,757                      129,764  53.5 45.1 
LaSalle                        23,073                         23,256  48.8 49.2 
Lawrence                          2,011                           3,857  33.6 64.4 
Lee                          6,937                           8,059  45.2 52.5 
Livingston                          5,020                           9,753  33.4 64.9 
Logan                          3,978                           7,844  33.0 65.1 
McDonough                          5,967                           6,147  47.9 49.4 
McHenry                        59,797                         71,598  44.5 53.3 
McLean                        31,883                         39,947  43.4 54.4 
Macon                        22,780                         25,309  46.6 51.8 
Macoupin                          9,464                         10,946  45.0 52.1 
Madison                        58,922                         60,608  48.1 49.5 
Marion                          6,225                           9,248  39.3 58.5 
Marshall                          2,455                           3,290  41.8 56.1 
Mason                          2,867                           3,265  45.5 51.9 
Massac                          2,092                           4,278  32.2 65.9 
Menard                          2,100                           3,948  34.1 64.2 
Mercer                          4,507                           3,876  52.6 45.2 
Monroe                          6,215                         10,888  35.5 62.3 
Montgomery                          5,058                           6,776  41.7 55.8 
Morgan                          5,806                           7,972  41.2 56.6 
Moultrie                          2,144                           3,784  35.4 62.5 
Ogle                          9,514                         13,422  40.7 57.4 
Peoria                        40,209                         36,774  51.3 46.9 
Perry                          3,819                           5,507  39.8 57.5 
Piatt                          3,090                           5,413  35.5 62.2 
Pike                          2,278                           4,860  31.3 66.7 
Pope                              650                           1,512  29.3 68.0 
Pulaski                          1,389                           1,564  46.1 51.9 
Putnam                          1,559                           1,502  49.7 47.9 
Randolph                          5,759                           8,290  39.9 57.4 
Richland                          2,362                           4,756  32.4 65.3 
Rock Island                        39,157                         24,934  60.2 38.4 
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St. Clair                        67,285                         50,125  56.2 41.8 
Saline                          3,701                           6,806  34.5 63.5 
Sangamon                        42,107                         50,225  44.7 53.3 
Schuyler                          1,727                           2,069  44.4 53.2 
Scott                              910                           1,587  35.6 62.1 
Shelby                          3,342                           6,843  32.2 65.8 
Stark                          1,095                           1,528  41.1 57.4 
Stephenson                        10,165                         10,512  48.1 49.8 
Tazewell                        24,438                         35,335  40.0 57.9 
Union                          3,137                           4,957  37.7 59.6 
Vermillion                        12,878                         16,892  42.5 55.7 
Wabash                          1,590                           3,478  31.0 67.7 
Warren                          4,044                           3,618  51.9 46.4 
Washington                          2,450                           4,792  33.0 64.5 
Wayne                          1,514                           5,988  19.7 77.8 
White                          2,188                           4,731  31.0 67.0 
Whiteside                        14,833                         10,448  57.6 40.5 
Will                      144,229                      128,969  52.0 46.5 
Williamson                        10,647                         17,909  36.4 61.2 
Winnebago                        61,732                         55,138  51.9 46.3 
Woodford                          5,572                         12,961  29.5 68.7 
Total                  3,019,512                   2,135,216  
  
     
     Source: http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ 
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Appendix B 
Counties Carried by Obama in 2008 and Lost by Obama in 2012 
  
2010 
Population 
% 
Whit
e 
%  
Black 
% 
Hispanic 
Median 
Home Value 
Per Capita 
Income 
Median 
Household 
Income 
% 
below 
Poverty 
1 Alexander 
             
8,238  61.6 35.8 2.0        56,300    14,617   27,727  25.8 
2 Carroll 
          
15,387  97.2 1.0 3.1 
     
102,500   26,196   45,433  13.1 
3 Champaign 
        
201,081  74.9 12.7 5.5 
     
147,800   $25,226   44,462  21.8 
4 Cook 
    
5,194,675  66.0 25.0 24.4  256,900   29,920   54,598  15.8 
5 Dekalb 
        
105,160  88.3 6.8 10.5  188,100   24,547   54,436  15.9 
6 DuPage 
        
916,924  82.3 5.1 13.6  309,800   38,405   77,598  6.2 
7 Fulton 
          
37,069  94.3 3.8 2.5   80,800  21,071   42,963  13.7 
8 Henderson 
             
7,331  98.1 0.3 1.2  82,900   23,237   47,944  11.4 
9 Henry 
          
50,486  96.3 1.8 4.9  109,900   25,931   50,698  10.2 
10 Jackson 
          
60,218  78.5 14.7 4.3  95,100   19,619   32,896  29.1 
11 Jo Daviess 
          
22,678  97.8 0.6 2.8 142,200  28,659   52,487  8.5 
12 Kane 
        
515,269  87.4 6.1 31.1 241,600  29,864   69,496  10.1 
13 Knox 
          
52,919  89.1 7.6 4.9  80,700  21,336   40,112  17.2 
14 Lake 
        
703,462  83.2 7.4 20.3  280,900  38,512   79,666  8.2 
15 Mercer 
          
16,434  98.4 0.4 1.9  98,200  25,878   51,216  9.5 
16 Peoria 
        
186,494  75.7 17.9 4.0  121,900   28,743   50,689  15.4 
17 Putnam 
             
6,006  97.8 0.8 4.3  126,800   25,510   52,409  11.6 
18 Rock Island 
        
147,546  85.9 9.3 11.9  113,100  25,609   46,726  12.4 
19 St. Clair 
        
270,056  65.8 30.5 3.4  126,300  25,475   50,109  16.3 
20 Warren   17,707  95.3 2.1 8.9  84,700  20,373   42,773  14.5 
44 
 
21 Whiteside 
          
58,498  95.8 1.7 11.2 99,700   24,370   46,444  11.7 
22 Will 
        
677,560  81.6 11.5 15.9 236,300  30,199   76,453  7.1 
23 Winnebago 
        
295,266  82.1 12.5 11.2  129,200   24,544   47,597  16.8 
          
 
Mean: 
       
415,933  85.8 9.4 8.9  143,987    25,993   $51,519  14.0 
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Appendix C 
Counties which voted for Romney in 2012 and McCain in 2008 
  
2010 
Population 
% 
White 
% 
Black 
% 
Hispanic 
 Median 
Home 
Value  
 Per 
Capita 
Income  
 Median 
Household 
Income  
% 
below 
Poverty 
1 Adams 
           
67,103  93.9 3.6 1.3 
     
99,900  
       
24,798     45,792  12.7 
2 Bond 
           
17,768  91.3 6.5 3.2 
   
107,300  
       
24,166     50,672  10.5 
3 Brown 
             
6,937  78.6 19.0 5.9 
     
80,000  
       
19,704     42,014  12.1 
4 Christian 
           
34,800  96.7 1.7 1.5 
     
82,000  
         
3,125     43,964  15.8 
5 Clark 
           
16,335  98.2 0.5 1.3 
     
84,700  
       
24,338     47,933  10.2 
6 Clay 
           
13,815  97.9 0.5 1.3     71,500  
       
21,577     38,905  16.9 
7 Clinton 
           
37,762  94.3 3.8 2.9 
   
125,200  
       
26,380     57,246  8.0 
8 Crawford 
           
19,817  93.3 4.9 2.1 
     
70,000  
       
23,387     43,923  16.4 
9 Cumberland 
           
11,048  98.0 0.7 0.9 
     
82,100  
       
21,715     43,255  13.1 
10 De Witt 
           
16,561  97.5 0.7 2.2 
   
104,400  
       
25,914     48,750  7.9 
11 Douglas 
           
19,900  97.7 0.6 6.4 
     
95,000  
       
22,339     47,921  10.2 
12 Edgar 
           
18,576  98.3 0.6 1.2 
     
72,400  
       
23,897     42,947  14.9 
13 Edwards 
             
6,721  98.0 0.7 1.0     61,500  
       
20,907     39,071  11.5 
14 Effingham 
           
34,242  98.2 0.4 1.9 
   
108,100  
       
25,566     50,938  10.7 
15 Fayette 
           
22,140  93.9 4.6 1.5 
     
78,400  
       
22,419     43,081  16.8 
16 Ford 
           
14,081  97.6 0.9 2.4     89,900  
       
25,302     50,332  9.2 
17 Franklin 
           
39,561  97.7 0.5 1.4 
     
63,200  
       
19,668     36,383  18.5 
18 Greene 
           
13,886  97.8 1.1 0.9 
     
71,800  
      
22,366     42,193  12.8 
19 Hamilton 
             
8,457  98.1 0.6 1.4 
     
74,100  
       
22,471     39,000  10.0 
20 Hancock 19,104  98.0 0.4 1.1 81,700  23,027     43,567  12.8 
21 Hardin  4,320  97.5 0.5 1.4 65,700  18,749     30,875  23.8 
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22 Iroquois 
           
29,718  97.2 1.0 5.7 
     
99,400  
       
24,563     48,248  11.5 
23 Jasper 
             
9,698  98.4 0.3 0.9 
     
82,700  
      
22,917     47,731  7.6 
24 Jefferson 
           
38,827  88.7 8.7 2.2 
     
87,000  
       
22,032     42,679  17.2 
25 Jersey 
           
22,985  97.5 0.5 1.1 
   
120,800  
       
24,940     54,469  8.9 
26 Johnson 
           
12,582  89.9 8.5 3.1 
     
93,400  
      
17,328     42,172  11.6 
27 Lawrence 
           
16,833  88.5 10.0 3.5  68,300  
       
17,050     38,326  16.2 
28 Lee 
           
36,031  92.4 5.2 5.1 
   
114,700  
      
25,303     49,451  9.5 
29 Livingston 
           
38,950  92.8 5.2 4.1 
  
105,600  
       
23,530     52,835  10.7 
30 Logan 
           
30,305  89.8 7.9 3.1 
     
95,700  
      
22,136    48,714  11.1 
31 Marion 
           
39,437  93.5 4.1 1.5  71,300  
       
21,418    40,097  16.5 
32 Marshall 
           
12,640  98.0 0.5 2.7  103,200  
     
25,600    51,642  9.3 
33 Massac 
           
15,429  91.5 5.9 2.0 
     
80,500  
       
20,044     40,885  16.7 
34 Menard 
           
12,705  97.6 0.9 1.1 
   
115,200  
       
26,300     56,943  7.9 
35 Monroe 
           
32,957  98.1 0.4 1.4 
   
201,300  
       
31,570     69,291  5.6 
36 Morgan 
           
35,547  91.2 6.3 2.2 
     
93,000  
       
23,598     44,731  15.0 
37 Moultrie 
           
14,846  98.3 0.5 1.0  93,300  
    
24,078     48,982  10.5 
38 Ogle 
           
53,497  9.8 1.1 9.1 
   
153,400  
      
25,803     57,094  10.3 
39 Perry 
           
22,350  88.9 8.8 2.8  76,600  
      
18,469     41,333  17.0 
40 Piatt 
           
16,729  97.9 0.6 1.2 122,200  
     
27,452     58,837  6.5 
41 Pike 
           
16,430  96.9 1.8 1.1  75,300  
     
20,383     40,668  16.2 
42 Pope 
             
4,470  91.4 6.7 1.5  87,400  
      
20,603     38,651  11.9 
43 Randolph 
           
33,476  88.4 10.0 2.7 
     
88,700  
       
21,442     46,148  12.4 
44 Richland 
           
16,233  97.3 0.7 1.4 76,000  
    
23,922     42,305  13.4 
45 Saline 
           
24,913  93.0 4.3 1.6  69,400  
     
21,626     36,083  17.0 
47 
 
46 Scott 
             
5,355  98.6 0.2 0.9 
     
83,100  
       
27,955     50,702  8.0 
47 Shelby 
           
22,363  98.5 0.5 1.0 
     
86,500  
       
22,522     44,689  10.5 
48 Stark 
             
5,994  97.7 0.7 1.2 
     
86,000  
      
24,952     49,693  12.1 
49 Tazewell 
        
135,394  96.4 1.3 2.0 
   
128,900  
       
27,395     54,617  8.5 
50 Union 
           
17,808  96.4 1.1 5.1 
     
88,200  
       
20,138     40,696  20.5 
51 Wabash 
           
11,947  97.2 0.8 1.4 
     
79,500  
       
23,629     47,426  12.7 
52 Washington 
           
14,716  97.9 0.8 1.5 
   
104,400  
       
25,177     53,036  8.4 
53 Wayne 
           
16,760  98.0 0.5 1.1 
     
69,300  
       
22,319    40,654  13.6 
54 White 
           
14,665  98.0 0.6 1.3 
     
67,800  
       
23,398    43,639  15.1 
55 Williamson 
           
66,357  93.9 4.2 2.0 
     
89,100  
       
22,903    56,576  16.9 
56 Woodford 
           
38,664  97.4 0.7 1.5 
   
152,200  
       
29,886    66,198  7.2 
 
N=56 
        
 
Average: 
          
24,653  93.7 2.9 2.2 
    
92,470  
      
22,932   $  46,696  12.5 
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Appendix D 
Counties Carried by Obama in 2008 and Lost by Obama in 2012 
          
  
2010 
Populati
on 
% 
White 
% 
Black 
% 
Hispanic 
Median 
Home 
Value 
Per 
Capita 
Income 
Median 
Household 
Income 
% 
below 
Poverty 
1 Boone 
           
54,165  93.2 2.5 20.3 
        
171,300  
        
26,323  
          
61,613  10.2 
2 Bureau 
           
34,978  96.8 0.8 7.9 
        
103,800  
        
25,344  
          
48,046  10.7 
3 Calhaun 
             
5,089  99.0 0.1 1.1 
        
109,400  
        
24,643  
          
48,958  12.4 
4 Cass 
           
13,642  94.2 3.8 17.3 
          
76,900  
        
19,947  
          
41,139  15.5 
5 Coles 
           
58,873  93.0 4.2 2.3 
          
93,100  
        
21,669  
          
38,294  22.1 
6 Gallatin 
             
5,589  98.0 0.4 1.3 
          
58,700  
        
22,674  
          
38,577  18.2 
7 Grundy 
           
50,063  96.2 1.6 8.4 
        
191,500  
        
28,159  
          
64,592  7.4 
8 Kankakee 
         
113,449  81.3 15.5 9.2 
        
147,700  
        
23,190  
          
49,266  15.0 
9 Kendall 
         
114,736  88.4 6.1 15.9 
        
239,300  
        
31,325  
          
82,649  3.8 
10 La Salle 
         
113,924  95.6 2.1 8.3 
        
127,500  
        
25,439  
          
52,469  10.4 
11 Macon 
         
110,768  79.8 16.4 2.0 
          
92,300  
        
25,797  
          
47,987  15.0 
12 Macoupin 
           
47,765  97.5 1.0 1.0 
          
94,900  
        
24,141  
          
48,739  11.8 
13 Madison 
         
269,282  89.0 8.0 2.9 
        
124,300  
        
26,939  
          
53,143  13.3 
14 Mason 
           
14,666  97.8 0.6 1.0 
          
81,500  
        
23,992  
          
42,929  15.5 
15 
McDonoug
h 
           
32,612  90.4 5.4 2.8 
          
87,000  
        
18,854  
          
34,186  23.0 
16 McHenry 
         
308,760  94.3 1.3 11.7 
        
243,500  
        
32,318  
          
76,909  6.9 
17 McLean 
         
169,572  85.5 7.6 4.6 
        
154,600  
        
29,425  
          
59,410  13.1 
18 
Montgome
ry 
           
30,104  95.3 3.4 1.6 
          
79,500  
        
22,205  
          
41,925  14.6 
19 Pulaski 
             
6,161  64.9 32.3 1.7 
          
50,500  
        
17,732  
          
31,712  22.7 
20 Sangamon 
         
197,465  83.9 12.0 1.9 
        
120,900  
        
29,167  
          
53,508  13.4 
49 
 
21 Schuyler 
             
7,544  95.6 3.2 1.6 
          
72,500  
        
22,215  
          
43,902  15.2 
22 
Stephenso
n 
           
47,711  87.5 9.3 3.1 
        
104,500  
        
23,413  
          
43,410  14.7 
23 Vermilion 
           
81,625  83.6 13.3 4.4 
          
76,100  
        
21,000  
          
40,463  18.8 
          
 
Mean: 
          
82,111  93.2 6.6 5.8 
       
117,448  
       
24,605  
         
49,732  14.1 
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Appendix E 
The Most Loyal Democratic Counties 
(Voted for the Party's Presidential Nominee 2000-2012) 
   
  
2010 Population 
Alexander 
 
                                                       8,238  
Champaign 
 
                                                   201,081  
Cook 
 
                                               5,194,675  
Fulton 
 
                                                     37,069  
Henderson 
 
                                                       7,331  
Jackson 
 
                                                     60,218  
Knox 
 
                                                     52,919  
Mercer 
 
                                                     16,434  
Peoria 
 
                                                   186,494  
Putnam 
 
                                                       6,006  
Rock Island 
 
                                                   147,546  
St. Clair 
 
                                                   270,056  
Whiteside 
 
                                                     58,498  
   Total 
 
                                               6,246,565  
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Appendix F 
The Most Loyal Republican Counties 
(Voted for the Party's Presidential Nominee 2000-2012) 
  
2010 Population 
1 Adams                                                         67,103  
2 Bond                                                         17,768  
3 Brown                                                           6,937  
4 Christian                                                         34,800  
5 Clark                                                         16,335  
6 Clay                                                         13,815  
7 Clinton                                                         37,762  
8 Crawford                                                         19,817  
9 Cumberland                                                         11,048  
10 Dewitt                                                         16,561  
11 Douglas                                                         19,900  
12 Edgar                                                         18,576  
13 Edwards                                                           6,721  
14 Effingham                                                         34,242  
15 Fayette                                                         22,140  
16 Ford                                                         14,081  
17 Greene                                                         13,886  
18 Hamilton                                                           8,457  
19 Hancock                                                         19,104  
20 Hardin                                                           4,320  
21 Iroquois                                                         29,218  
22 Jasper                                                           9,698  
23 Jefferson                                                         38,827  
24 Jersey                                                         22,985  
25 Johnson                                                         12,582  
26 Lawrence                                                         16,833  
27 Lee                                                         36,031  
28 Livingston                                                         38,950  
29 Logan                                                         30,305  
30 Marion                                                         39,437  
31 Marshall                                                         12,640  
32 Massac                                                         15,429  
33 Menard                                                         12,705  
34 Monroe                                                         32,957  
35 Morgan                                                         35,547  
36 Moutrie                                                         14,846  
37 Ogle                                                         53,497  
38 Piatt                                                         16,729  
52 
 
39 Pike                                                         16,430  
40 Pope                                                           4,470  
41 Randolph                                                         33,476  
42 Richland                                                         16,233  
43 Saline                                                         24,913  
44 Scott                                                           5,355  
45 Shelby                                                         22,363  
46 Stark                                                           5,994  
47 Tazewell                                                       135,394  
48 Union                                                         17,808  
49 Wabash                                                         11,947  
50 Washington                                                         14,716  
51 Wayne                                                         16,760  
52 White                                                         14,665  
53 Williamson                                                         66,357  
54 Woodford                                                         38,664  
   
 
Total                                                   1,318,134  
 
